In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies that accounts for the following phenomena:
Introduction
The distinctive characteristic of parliamentary democracies is the fact that the executive derives its mandate from and is politically responsible to the legislature. This has two consequences. First, unless one party wins a majority of seats, the government is not determined by an election alone, but is the result of an elaborate bargaining process among the parties represented in the parliament. Second, parliamentary governments may lose the con¯dence of the parliament at any time, which leads to their immediate termination.
The following is a list of prominent empirical regularities about the formation and termination of parliamentary governments.
1. Governments frequently terminate before the end of the legislative period. While most governments are immediately replaced by a new cabinet, 45% of all governments terminate in an early election (Diermeier and Stevenson n.d.) .
2. Cabinets frequently reshu²e the allocation of cabinet posts and other government positions during their lifetime (Laver and Shepsle 1996) .
3. Minimal winning governments are not the norm. Only 39% of all governments formed (when no party holds a majority of seats) are minimal winning. Minority governments occur in about 37% of all government formations, surplus governments in 23% (Strom 1990; Laver and Scho¯eld 1990) .
4. Minority governments are, on average, less stable than other governments (Strom 1990 ), but some minority governments survive until the next regular election. Moreover, For recent overviews of the large empirical literature on government formation and termination see Laver and Scho¯eld 1990 , Strom 1990 , and Warwick 1994 There is substantial cross-country variation in the types of governments formed. Germany almost always had minimal winning coalitions, but of the 20 Danish governments between 1945 and 1987 18 were minority governments. In Italy surplus governments form in 45% of all cases no party commands a majority of seats.. if a minority government terminates, it is frequently replaced by another minority government even after an early election.
While these regularities are well documented empirically, no theoretical model exists that can simultaneously explain all of them. Recently, a series of non-cooperative models have been proposed to account for the¯rst regularity. These models interpret cabinets as equilibria in a legislative bargaining process. Lupia and Strom (1995) consider a one round bargaining model with outside options or \events". They focus on a particular type of events related to electoral prospects based on public opinion polls. That is, events are interpreted as common knowledge information about what would happen if parliament were dissolved and an election held immediately. Parties with favorable electoral prospects may either realize their advantage at the pools or extract bene¯ts through bargaining with parties that would loose seats in an early election. Whether gains are realized in a new government coalition ("a replacement") or in the calling of early elections (a "dissolution") depends on the relative magnitude of election and negotiation related transaction costs. Baron (1998) proposes a dynamic model of government stability using an in¯nite horizon version of the legislative bargaining model proposed by Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) .
They show that the very fact that ruling coalitions need to maintain the con¯dence of the chamber, allows them to capture almost all the rents from legislation. This result holds if su±ciently many bargaining periods are left and future payo®s are not discounted too heavily. Baron shows that if this condition is not satis¯ed, governments may fall because some ruling party's current reservation value may be too high compared to the future bene¯ts of maintaining the current government. In his model any government termination is a replacement.
In line with the previous literature we interpret cabinets as the outcome of a legislative bargaining process. Like Baron, but in contrast to Lupia and Strom, we resort to a dynamic bargaining model with random events. In contrast to Baron we also allow for the dissolution of parliament and cabinet reshu²es. Our model accounts for the occurrence of minority and surplus coalitions and the relative instability of minority governments. Most of the traditional literature views minority governments as pathologies.
! Strom (1990) , however, suggests that minority governments may be the result of rational calculations by parties for whom government participation would be too costly. While there is some empirical support for this view, to date there is no satisfactory theoretical account for minority governments.
"
To build a model that allows for minority governments we¯rst need to clarify what we mean by a \government". Following Shepsle (1990, 1996) we identify a government with control over government ministries. Thus, a party that supports a minority government on critical votes but does not hold any cabinet portfolios is not part of the government, but is only part of the supporting coalition. In our model this assumption has two consequences.
First, holding a ministry implies political control of the bureaucracy. This is important, since in parliamentary democracies the e®ective power to draft and implement public policy rests with the civil service. # Since members of the government alone can control and verify the implementation of policies, bargains on policy with parties outside of the cabinet are not credible. It follows that only the members of a government decide on policies.
Second, membership in the cabinet allows control over government posts. While some of these posts have direct in°uence over policy, others are better interpreted as perks that are valued by all actors and thus can be freely distributed. Examples are well-paid positions on boards of state-owned businesses or the national television. These government posts can be interpreted as transferable bene¯ts or \money" that can be allocated by the cabinet. Since ! For an overview see chapter 1 of Strom (1990) . " Laver and Shepsle (1990) propose a structure-induced equilibrium model of minority governments, but, as demonstrated by Austen-Smith and Banks (1990) , their existence result does not generalize. Baron (1998) considers a model where minority governments could be sustained, but they are never chosen in equilibrium.
# See Laver and Shepsle (1994) for supporting empirical evidence.
money can be exchanged for policy concessions, governing coalitions can bargain e±ciently on policies. $ These bene¯ts may also be allocated to parties in the supporting coalition in exchange for their votes. Given that appointments to government jobs are easily veri¯able, cabinets may thus buy parliamentary support by allocating money to opposition parties.
However, since only the cabinet controls the allocation of perks, transfers can only be made from the government to outside parties. To summarize, a government is a set of parties that can e±ciently bargain over policy and the distribution of perks. Perks may also be allocated to parties that are not members of the government. In particular, they can be used to sustain minority governments.
Distributive bene¯ts, however, are not only important to buy support for a minority government. They are also critical for our model of coalition bargaining. In our paper we use a version of e±cient proto-coalition bargaining (Baron and Diermeier 1998) . The main advantage of this approach is that the policy chosen by any coalition depends only on the parties' policy preferences. It does not depend on the details of the bargaining process or the location of the status quo policy. So, each proto-coalition is uniquely associated with a policy: the policy it would implement if it were in government. To implement e±cient bargaining, we allow the parties to make transfers of o±ce-holding bene¯ts. For any given bargaining procedure we can then calculate the pay-o®s each party would receive in a protocoalition. This induces preferences over proto-coalitions for the actor that is entitled to propose a potential government (a so-called "formateur"). Proposing a government then is a simple one-person optimization problem.
There is a long and distinguished tradition in the study of multi-party coalitions that has focused on minimal winning coalitions as the "natural" outcome of a government formation game (e.g. Scho¯eld 1990, ch.5, Baron 1998) . In the one period version of our model we derive exactly the opposite conclusion: a minimal winning coalition is never chosen.
$ Laver and Shepsle (1990) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1990) consider models where each minister is a dictator on his policy dimension. In our model policies are the result of e±cient cabinet bargaining.
Depending on the status quo we will either see minority or supermajority governments. The intuition here is that in e±cient bargaining the size of the "pie" depends on the coalition members. If the formateur's share is increasing in the pie size, then he will prefer either to go alone (minority government) or to include as many other parties as possible (supermajority government). But then, why do we observe minimal winning coalitions?
The reason minimal winning governments occur at all lies in the need of to maintain existing governments in the presence of changes in the political and economic environment.
To demonstrate this insight we need to consider a two-period model of coalition bargaining with both public opinion and policy shocks. Ruling coalitions may need to reshu²e o±ce bene¯ts among the member parties to preserve their governments, because a shift in the status quo may increase the outside options of some coalition member. But reshu²es may be expensive. Thus, in situations were in the one-period model a supermajority government would have been chosen, the formateur in a two period model now may prefer a minimal winning coalition, since the risk of a costly reshu²e in the future is lower. Further, in cases where a minority government would have formed, the formateur may now prefer to form a minimal winning coalition, because the price for current and future outside support may be too high. In equilibrium, all types of government can occur, including minority governments with a high risk of terminating in the second period.
This has three consequences: First, minority governments may terminate. This can be the case, if due to a policy shift, the price for external support becomes to high. Second, majoritarian governments (i.e. minimal winning or surplus governments) never terminate, but may internally reshu²e o±ce bene¯ts. Third, the need to reshu²e or buy more expensive external support in the second period creates incentives to form minimal winning coalitions.
The Model
We consider a two-period spatial model of government formation and termination in a parliamentary democracy which builds on the framework developed by Baron and Diermeier (1998) . Let N = f1; :::; ng denote the set of parties in a parliamentary democracy and assume that n = 3. Each party i 2 N has time-separable quasi-linear preferences over policy outcomes x 2 < and distributive bene¯ts y i 2 <. We assume that the per-period utility function of party i, i = 1; 2; 3, is given by
and the parties ideal points z i = (z i ; z i ) 2 < , i = 1; 2; 3, are located symmetrically. Without further loss of generality, we normalize the parties ideal points so that z = (0; 0), z = (1; 0), and z ! = ( ; F ! ). This speci¯cation captures the intuition that parties care both about policy outcomes and the bene¯ts from holding o±ce. We normalize aggregate transfers to be zero in each period (i.e., P i N y i = 0), and assume that utility in the second period is discounted at a common discount factor¯2 [0; 1].
Period 1 begins after a general election (not modeled here), which determines the parties relative shares in the parliament
. This assumption implies that no single party has a majority of seats, but any two-party coalition is winning under majority rule. Also given in period 1 is a default policy q 2 Q = fz ; z ; z ! g. This is the policy that is implemented if no government forms in that period. % It determines each party's payo® in period 1 if such an event occurs. Our assumption about Q implies that the default policy may be particularly favorable to one of the parties. If q = z j , we refer to party j as the party favored by the default policy.
Let s´(q; ¼) 2 S = Q £ ¦ denote the state of the political system in period 1, which is summarized by the default policy and the distribution of parliamentary seat shares among % The default policy can be interpreted, for example, as the current state of the economy, or the policy that would be implemented by a caretaker government.
the parties.
At the beginning of period 1, the head of state chooses one of the parties to try to form a government. We refer to the selected party | 2 N as the formateur. We assume that the head of state is non-strategic and each party i 2 N is selected to be a formateur with probability equal to its seat share ¼ i At the beginning of period 2 a new default policy q 0 2 Q = fz 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 g is realized.
We assume that the default policy follows a Markov process with transition probabilities & For an empirical justi¯cation of this assumption see Diermeier and Merlo (1999) .
' We assume that bargaining takes no time and hence there is no within period discounting.
Also at the beginning of period 2, the parties receive a common signal about the seat share each party would receive if the current parliament were dissolved and an early election called. Let
denote the vector of the new shares. We assume that ¼ 0 = ¼ + ", where " = (" 1 ; " 2 ; " 3 ) is a random vector that takes the value (0; 0; 0) with probability ½ and takes each of the values (¡2e; e; e), (e; ¡2e; e), or (e; e; ¡2e) with probability 1¡½ 3 , and e is small. 10 In particular, we assume that it is still the case that ¼ 0 2 ¦, and that
This assumption captures the fact that in multiparty parliamentary democracies it is very unlikely that one party could gain (or lose) signi¯cant shares in a short period of time. In the case of an early election each party incurs a small cost of dissolution ± with ± ! 0: 
If instead no government forms, then each party i 2 N receives a period 2 payo® of U i (q ; 0).
At the end of period 2 a regularly scheduled election takes place and any incumbent government has to resign.
Results
Since the model we consider is a game with complete information and a¯nite horizon, we focus on the characterization of its subgame perfect equilibrium using backwards induction.
Our characterization is presented in a series of lemmata which illustrate the main properties of the equilibrium of each subgame. A proposition containing the main result of the paper concludes the analysis.
The¯rst two lemmata pertain to government formation in period 2. While this analysis is necessary to characterize subgame-equilibria for the case where the period 1 government has terminated (or where no government formed in the¯rst period), it also captures the base-line one-period version of our model. We can then see why a dynamic model with shocks is necessary to account for the empirical regularities mentioned in the introduction.
Lemma 1: Suppose a government formation process begins in period 2 and D is chosen as the proto-coalition. Then for any s 2 S and for any D µ N, D forms the government.
Furthermore, the chosen policy is
and transfers are equal to
and
Proof: All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
Lemma 1 generalizes the Baron-Diermeier model of government formation bargaining to the case of minority governments. In contrast to Baron-Ferejohn models of coalition bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Baron 1991) bargaining is e±cient. That is, the negotiation parties will choose the policy that maximizes the proto-coalition's aggregate utility. Transfers are used to implement the optimal policy. It follows that in contrast to
Baron-Ferejohn models, the policy choice of any coalition is independent of the default policy and does not depend on the details of the bargaining procedure. So, while the allocation of transfers r(D; s ) re°ects bargaining power, the chosen policy only depends on the ideal points of the coalition members. 11 Note also that no government coalition needs to make transfers to parties outside the coalition.
The second lemma characterizes which government coalitions can form in period 2, if government formation is necessary. To answer this question, for any state in period 2 and for any formateur, we have to solve the formateur's maximization problem:
This insight is general for a broad classes of quasi-linear preferences with strictly qausi-concave prefernces on policy (see Baron and Diermeier 1998) . We use quadratic preferences for simplicity.
Let D | (s ) denote the solution to this optimization problem.
Lemma 2: For any government formation process in period 2 with ¼; ¼ 2 ¦; and for any i; j; | 2 N, i 6 = j 6 = | 6 = i. Note that Lemma 2 implies that in a one period model a minimal winning coalition government never forms. Only minority or surplus governments can form. This is exactly the opposite conclusion of most previous non-cooperative models of government formation (e.g. Baron 1991, Laver and Scho¯eld 1990) . The reason is that if a formateur can extract transfers from any other party during proto-coalition bargaining, then it is optimal to extract payments from all other parties. This leads to surplus governments if the formateur is favored by the status quo. Otherwise, the formateur chooses to form a minority government.
This follows, because at least one other party is indi®erent between the status quo and the formateur's ideal point. So, the formateur can obtain that party's support for free. Whether a formateur selects a minority government or a supermajority government thus depends on the other parties' willingness to make transfers in exchange for a policy compromise. In either case a minimal winning coalition is dominated by some other choice.
Using Lemma 2 we can compute each party i's expected continuation payo® for any s if a new government needs to be formed in period 2. Since continuation values depend on whether an early election has been called, we denote party i's expected continuation payo®
by W E (q ;1), where1 2 f¼; ¼ g.
First consider the case where the second period default policy is the party's ideal point,
i.e. q = z E . Then, with probability1 E party i is chosen as formateur yielding i a payo®
For another framework that generates surplus governments, see Baron and Diermeier (1998) .
of U`(x(f1; 2; 3g; z`); r`(x(f1; 2; 3g; z`)) = ! . With probability 1 ¡1 i some other party j is chosen as formateur in which case i receives the payo® U`(x(fjg); 0) = ¡1. Hence,
Second, suppose that the default policy is another party j's ideal point. With probability1 i party i is chosen as formateur, yielding the party the payo®
while with probability1 j party j is chosen. In this case j forms a supermajority government yielding party i the payo® U i (x(f1; 2; 3g; z j ); r i (x(f1; 2; 3g; z j )) = ¡ ! . Finally, with probability 1 ¡1 i ¡1 j the third party h is chosen as formateur yielding party i the payo®
We can now use these continuation values to the conditions under which the parliament would decide on early elections in period 2.
Lemma 3: Suppose the parliament has to decide whether to dissolve and call early elections in period 2. For any q 2 Q, whenever ¼ 6 = ¼, an early election is called.
Lemma 3 states that if changes in public opinion shifts lead to changes in the parties' expected seat share, then a majority of parties is better o® voting for early elections. The likelihood of this event is equal to 1 ¡ ½.
It also follows that each party's continuation value W i (s ) depends only on ¼ : Thus for any party i 2 N and q = z h with h 2 N; we have
which corresponds to each party's continuation value for terminating the incumbent government during the renegotiation stage and for¯aling to form a government in period 1.
The next lemma pertains to the renegotiation stage of an incumbent government and characterizes the conditions under which a government would prematurely terminate.
Lemma 4: Suppose D µ N is the incumbent government at the beginning of period 2.
(i) If D is a majority government, then for any s 2 S, D remains in power throughout period 2. Furthermore, the chosen policy is
and transfers are equal to and transfers are equal to
Cabinet renegotiation is conducted under the same rules as proto{coalition bargaining.
But in contrast to the one-period case characterized in Lemma 1, minority cabinets now do not receive support from some other party for free. Rather, they need to transfer bene¯ts to the cheaper of the two outside parties. This follows, because each party now has a chance to be selected as the formateur and to collect the bene¯ts from proposing the period 2 proto-coalition.
The price of support depends on each party's continuation values. Since the order of continuation values for the outside parties depends only on the parties' seat shares, the governing party would form a supporting coalition with the smaller of the two parties. However, the price of gaining support from even the cheapest party may still leave the party that forms the minority government worse o® than its continuation value. For this to hold two conditions must be satis¯ed. First, both outside parties must be rather large. This follows because the necessary transfers are increasing in the continuation values which, given (7) are incrasing in seat share. Second, the minority party's ideal point must equal the period 2 default policy. In this case, both outside parties are strictly worse o® by implementing the minority govements ideal policy.
The situation is di®erent for majority cabinets, since these governments do not need outside support. However, depending on each governing parties continuation values, o±ce bene¯ts need to be reallocated among the coalition members. As Lemma 4 indicates, this is always possible for any ¼ and s . Reshu²es, allow incumbent governments to adjust for changes in the political and economic environment without terminating. The model can thus account for government terminations (fact 1) the relative instability of minority governments (fact 4), and the frequent occurrence of reshu²es (fact 2) provided these types of governments are actually chosen in period 1.
Lemma 4 allows us to qualify some of the results found in the literature. For example, as Lupia and Strom (1995) we¯nd that in equilibrium governments may terminate in early elections and replacements. However, once we allow for e±cient bargaining and reshu²es, Using Lemma 4, for any given s and for any government coalition D, we can compute the expected payo® to each party i 2 N in period 2 following a renegotiation by the government
The next lemma pertains to the outcome of the government formation process in period 1 for a given proto-coalition.
Lemma 5: Suppose at the beginning of period 1 D is chosen as the proto-coalition.
(i) For any s 2 S and for any D µ N, D forms the government and chooses policy
( 1 4 ) (ii) For any s 2 S, if D is a majority government period 1 transfers are equal to
and t j (D; s) = 0, j 2 NnD.
( 1 6 )
For any s 2 S, j 6 = i 6 =`6 = i 2 N; period 1 transfers are equal to By combining the results of the¯ve previous lemmata, for any given s we can compute the expected utility of each party i 2 N in period 1 conditional on each possible government coalition forming in period 1
These calculations represent the basis for the main result of the paper, stated in the following proposition, which characterizes the outcome of the government formation process in period 1. This characterization hinges on the solution of the following maximization problem faced by the formateur in period 1, for any state and for any formateur: 
`g forms the government; and for ¼`< p ¤ (¯) and
; 2; 3g forms the government,`; j; | 2 N,`6 = j 6 = |. >From Lemma 2, we know that the solution to the one-period optimization problem is for party 1 to form the surplus government coalition f1; 2; 3g. Dynamic considerations, however, play an important role, since party 1's choice in period 1 also a®ects its period 2 payo®.
Lemma 4 implies that the coalition f1; 2; 3g would persist in period 2, but that depending on the default policy in period 2 o±ce bene¯ts may need to be reshu²ed among the governing parties. In particular, while the period 1 payo® resulting from choosing coalition f1; 2; 3g dominates the payo® induced, for example, by the choice of f1; 2g, the opposite is true with respect to period 2 payo®s. This is the case since, loosely speaking, in the renegotiation stage, party 1 would only have to compensate one party as opposed to two parties to prevent them from leaving the current coalition with the expectation of obtaining a higher payo® in a new government formation process. Since a party's future prospects improve with its share, these considerations are particularly relevant when party 1's coalition partners are relatively \big". Hence, as the discount factor converges to 1, if either party 2 or party 3 controls more than ! of the parliamentary seats, party 1 chooses to team up with the smaller of the two and form a minimal winning government rather than a surplus government.
Next, consider the case where party 2 is the formateur. Again, from Lemma 2 we know that the solution to the one-period optimization problem would be for party 2 to form the minority government f2g with the external support of party 3. When dynamic considerations are taken into account, however, the next best alternative from a static point of view (i.e., forming a minimal winning government with party 3) may dominate. To see why, recall from Lemma 5 that, if f2g forms the government and continues in period 2, it will seek the support of party 1 if and only if ¼ ! is greater than ¼ . But then it has to compensate party 3 in period 1 for the fact that in the second period party 3 will not receive any transfers. The size of this compensation is increasing in the discount factor¯. Hence, if the parties are su±ciently forward looking, then party 2 chooses to include party 3 in the government coalition rather than elicit its external support via expensive transfers. Thus minimal winning, supermajority and minority governments can occur in equilibrium which accounts for fact (3)
Note also that party 2 may choose to form a minority government even though it knows of the risk to fall in period 2. This will be the case where all three parties are of similar size. In this case both other potential supporting parties would be too expensive to buy o® in period 2, or to include in a minimal winning coalition. Hence, unstable minority governments can form on the equilibrium path. This accounts for fact (4).
Proposition 1 thus implies that the stability and the relative occurrence of di®erent types of governments are closely connected. Minimal winning coalitions are relatively cheaper to maintain than either minority or surplus coalitions. These considerations a®ect which kind of governments form. In the case of minority coalitions, the necessity to pay o® an outside party that is willing to support the government may bring the government down or induce a minority government not to form. The price of support is determined by the outside party's continuation value that depends on its relative seat share and the state of the world. If both potential outside partners are expensive, a formateur may choose to form a minority government that is destined to fall (if the formateur's future prospects looks favorable) or form a stable minimal winning government instead. In the case of surplus governments, the need to keep all members of the government in the coalition may induce a surplus government not to form. While it is always possible to make transfers within the government coalition to maintain a surplus government, if the coalition partners are large relative to the formateur party, a formateur may choose to form a minimal winning coalition instead.
Conclusion
Most game-theoretic models coalition formation in parliamentary democracies predict minimal winning coalitions. In this paper we propose a bargaining model of parliamentary governments where all types of governments (minimal winning, minority, and surplus) may form. Moreover, minority and surplus coalitions are not rare exceptions, but may be chosen for all parameter values. Indeed, contrary to the prevailing view that minimal winning coalitions are the natural outcome of coalition bargaining, our model implies the opposite.
In the single-period version of our model, minimal winning coalitions would never form. The party favored by the default policy would always choose a surplus coalition, and a nonfavored party would always form a minority government. Minimal winning coalitions only occur when dynamic considerations are important. That is, minimal winning coalitions are chosen, because it may be too expensive for a formateur to maintain surplus or minority coalitions over time, especially if the future state of the world is likely to favor a di®erent party.
Our model also accounts for the fact that majoritarian governments (minimal winning and surplus) are considerably more stable than minority governments. While majoritarian governments always survive until the next regularly scheduled election, possibly by reshu²ing government positions among the members of the government coalition. minority governments can terminate in early elections or be replaced by a new (minority !) government in a vote of no-con¯dence. Indeed, minority governments may still form even though all parties know that there exist states of the world where a minority government would fall for sure in the next period.
While our model can account for these basic regularities, it is too stylized to explain cross-country di®erences in government formation and stability. Why are there so many surplus coalitions is Italy, but none in Denmark or Germany? Why are minority governments unheard of in Germany, but are the norm in Denmark? What explains the di®erences in average government duration between countries? To answer these questions our model would need to be \augmented" to capture some of the institutional details of government formation that may account for cross-country di®erences. The model presented here represents a¯rst step toward addressing these questions in a systematic fashion.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose¯rst that D obtains the con¯dence of the parliament given transfers t j (D ; s ), j 2 NnD . For any policy x 2 < coalition D may choose to implement, the requirement that all coalition members have to agree de¯nes a \cake" to be allocated among the coalition partners if they agree on that policy
Given the bargaining procedure speci¯ed, the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game which determines how the cake is allocated (and hence the transfers within the coalition), is that parties immediately agree on a split of the cake such that each party i 2 D 0 receives an equal share Binmore (1987) for the two-player case and Merlo and Wilson (1998) for the general case).
Since each party wants to maximize its share of the cake, it immediately follows that all parties in D 0 unanimously agree to select the policy that maximizes the size of the cake: 
where 
Since the external support of one party is enough to obtain the con¯dence of the parliament, f|g pays the least amount possible to at most one party. Note that for any q 0 2 Q, there always exists some party j 2 N, j 6 = |, for which u j (q
This implies that c(x(D 0 ; s 0 ); D 0 ; s 0 ) > 0, and hence D 0 forms the government.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: By Lemma 1, for any | 2 N, any q 0 2 Q, and any ¼; ¼ 0 2 ¦, U | (x(f1; 2; 3g; s 0 ); r | (x(f1; 2; 3g;
Next, note that for any i; j; | 2 N, i 6 = j 6 = |, u | ( z +z +z ! Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose at the beginning of period 2 there is no incumbent government or the incumbent government has terminated. It is easy to see that for any party i 2 N,
and hence party i votes in favor of an early election. Obviously, if and hence no party votes in favor of an early election. Therefore, for any realization of " such that ¼ 6 = ¼, since it is always the case that two parties gain at the expenses of the third party, a majority strictly prefers to dissolve the parliament and call early elections.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
The argument is analogous to the one presented in the proof of Lemma
Suppose¯rst that D has maintained the con¯dence of the parliament given transfers
Then the cake to be allocated among the coalition partners if they remain together and agree on a policy x 2 < 2 is 
which given (7) and symmetry reduces to
to stay in power, in which case party i's period 2 payo® is equal to
Alternatively, fig could terminate, in which case party i would receive a period 2 expected payo® equal to
Obviously, fig chooses to make the transfer and stay in power if and only if
Given (7) and q 0 = (z h ; ¼ 0 ) for some h 2 N this reduces to
Note, that this inequality is always satis¯ed for h 6 = i. In the case where h = l it reduces to (7) and (21)), and
and hence we can rewrite the expression for the transfer as
Without loss of generality, assume that ¼ j ¼`. Then, Lemma 4 implies that for all q (1 ¡ ¼`) (i.e., f|g receives the external support of party`and terminates in the second period if q 0 = |),
First, note that if ¼ j < ¼`, then | prefers fj; |g to f`; |g, and it prefers f|g with the external support of j to f|g with the external support of`, while the opposite is true if 
